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The transition economies were remarkably successful in curbing the inflation that took 
place after the initial transition and shocks and, more recently, most of the countries have 
brought inflation down to the levels found in major developed countries. In this paper we 
review the experiences and show how fiscal discipline, monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy contributed to the outcome. In addition, we note that the influence of EU accession 
on institutions and policy may have played an important role. The paper also surveys the 
literature on the quality of the inflation data, the extent to which necessary relative price 
adjustments have occurred and the size of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Case studies of 
disinflation in four countries are presented: Poland, Romania, Estonia and Russia. 
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Siirtymätaloudet ovat olleet hyvin menestyksekkäitä inflaation vaimentamisessa. Yleensä 
inflaatio kiihtyi hyvin nopeaksi transition alkuvaiheessa, mutta tällä hetkellä useimpien 
siirtymätalouksien inflaatio on samalla tasolla kuin kehittyneissä teollisuusmaissa. Tässä 
tutkimuksessa käsitellään keinoja, joilla inflaatio on saatu aisoihin. Finanssi- ja 
rahapolitiikka sekä valuuttakurssijärjestelmä ovat kaikki olleet osallisina inflaation 
vaimentamisessa. Lisäksi EU-jäsenyyden mahdollisuus lienee vaikuttanut instituutioiden ja 
talouspolitiikan muotoutumiseen useissa maissa. Tutkimuksessa käsitellään lisäksi 
inflaatiodatan laatua, suhteellisten hintojen muutoksia sekä Balassan-Samuelsonin efektiä. 
Lähemmin tarkastellaan inflaation hidastumista neljässä siirtymätalousmaassa eli Puolassa, 
Romaniassa, Venäjällä ja Virossa. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The transition to market based economies began just a little more than a decade ago in 
twenty seven countries of Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Most observers in 
the early 1990s thought that the transition process would be long and tedious. Early 
transition experiences seemed to support that expectation. Most of the transition countries 
experienced sharp initial declines in output, periods of rapid inflation, including many 
hyperinflations, and enormous political obstacles to reform. There was ample reason to 
believe that transition would be a specific area of concern to economists for many years to 
come.  However, the unique transition experiences are largely past in most countries and 
the term transition economics might even be disappearing from view. At the very least, the 
term is barely relevant in much of Central Europe although it is still applicable in the 
republics of the former Soviet Union, and possibly China. That is not to say that these 
countries are trouble free but that they share the problems that are common to other 
emerging market economies. However, some of the advanced transition countries are 
quickly leaving that status. Nothing symbolizes this more than the spring 2004 accession to 
the European Union of eight formerly planned economies from the Baltics, through Central 
Europe and in the Balkans.  
The rapidity of the transition experience is well illustrated by the path of inflation in 
these countries. Not surprisingly, one of the first manifestations of transition was high 
inflation. The causes of these inflationary outbursts were classical. First, the removal of 
price controls and quantity allocations, which repressed demand, led to rapid adjustments 
to free market prices. Second, fiscal and financial crises resulted in periods of rapid 
monetary expansion as governments relied on seignorage to support budgets as well as 
state owned enterprises.  In the early 1990s more than half of the transition countries 
experienced at least one year with annual inflation rates in excess of 1000 per cent or close 
to it.  However, stabilization policies were in place in virtually every transition country by 
1995 and the policies were remarkably successful. Since 1997 only three countries have 
experienced annual inflation rates in excess of 100 percent. By 2002, annual inflation rates 
were below 15 percent in all but five countries and below 5 percent in just half.
1 The 
transition experience with inflation is nothing short of remarkable.  
                                                 
1   EBRD data for the annual average consumer price level, see Table 1.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Why did the transition economies do so well so quickly in bringing inflation under 
control?  One answer is that the consensus view of stabilization policy had just come into 
its own in the policy world by the 1990s. Approaches to macroeconomics and policy 
making which were not self-evident to the leaders and intellectuals of the less developed 
world in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, were learned quickly in the transition world in the 1990s.  
Thus, the Latin American experiences of generations that repeatedly fought inflation 
without a political consensus that accepted macroeconomic realities were not repeated in 
Central Europe.   
Another answer, based on the political economy of transition, was suggested early on 
by Havrylyshyn (1997). Policymakers were able to introduce disinflation policies when 
they coincided with the interests of powerful oligarchs. At the start of transition, the elite 
took advantage of inflation, low interest rates and a poor institutional structure to transfer 
capital from the state to private interests. Once established as capitalists, the elite had an 
interest in disinflation. There are countries where disinflation did not take hold so quickly. 
Russia seemed to follow Latin American experience for much of the 90s; high and 
persistent fiscal deficits ultimately lead to a financial crisis and reemergence of high 
inflation in 1998. However, this might be explained by continued tension between the 
interests of the oligarchs and the government in Russia.  
The experience with disinflation does not imply that transition economics is a complete 
success. Although, the lessons of stabilization policy were largely learned, there are other 
areas economic issues where transition problems are still extant. In particular, health, 
education and pension systems are largely unchanged and subsides to government owned 
enterprises are still common. Important institutional reforms are still needed so, for 
example, property right are clearly defined and fairly enforced. Confidence in the rule of 
law is far from perfect and corporate governance needs to be improved. Moreover, 
liberalization of the economies and support for a competitive environment might face 
opposition from private sector monopolist interests.  
The influence of Western investors and institutions in the transition economies may be 
another important reason why the transition economies were able to adopt stabilization 
policies rapidly. Relatively large flows of FDI and portfolio investment into the fast track 
transition economies of Europe (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) started 
immediately after the transition. Pressures for institutional reform accompanied these 
flows. In addition, reform elements in these countries found an environment with an Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
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institutional memory of market institutions and the human capital to jump-start the process. 
Furthermore, some countries, Hungary in particular, started tentative market reforms 
already in the 80s, which made the subsequent transition process easier. As a result, policy 
and regulatory abuses in these countries were rather short lived. And by the mid-1990s, the 
fast track transition economies had reformed the financial sector and established sound 
institutional structures for monetary policy. With these accomplishments, it is not 
surprising that stabilization policy fell into place. 
Another important answer is the pull of Europe.  For a variety of political and social 
reasons, the nations of central Europe have an overwhelming desire to be part of Europe 
and the institutions of the European community. So, a consensus commitment to join 
Europe led to a willingness to adopt stringent economic policies and structural reforms in 
the countries chosen for accession. This has also influenced policy in the other Balkan 
countries that do not want to be left out of the second wave and also some of the other 
countries (e.g. the Ukraine) that do not want to appear un-European.  
We begin the discussion with an overview of the inflation experience in transition. 
Only a brief overview is needed because this is far from the first essay to take note of the 
remarkable inflation history in the region. Koen and De Masi (1997) surveyed the initial 
experiences in transition and Dabrowski (1999) and Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) looked at 
phenomenon as of the late 1990s. Table 1 shows annual CPI inflation rates for the 
transition countries separated into three regional groups. In all groups the median inflation 
rates have declined steadily. For the CEE countries the median dipped below 50% per year 
in 1993 while in the CIS, that milestone was passed in 1996. The 10% threshold for the 
median was passed in 1997 in CEE; the median FSU inflation rate almost reached that 
level in 1998 and again in 2001 but did not fall below 10% until 2002. The strongest 
efforts to bring inflation down to European levels were in the countries selected for 
accession to the EU. The reference rate for inflation using the Maastricht convergence 
criteria was between 3 and 3.5 percent in the three years 2000-02.
2 The median accession 
country inflation rate reached this threshold in 2002. The median inflation rate in the 8 
countries that enter the EU in 2004 was 2.6% in 2002, not much more than the Euro area 
inflation rate of 2.3%.  
                                                 
2  The Maastricht Treaty set the reference rate for inflation convergence as the average of the three 
lowest inflation rates in the EU plus 1.5%.  If this rule is applied to the countries in the Euro area, 
the reference rates are 3.2, 3.5 and 3.0 in 2000-02.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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A good measure of the success of disinflation is a sustained low inflation for which we 
use the average inflation rates for the 5 year period 1998-2002. The five year average was 
below 5% in the Baltics, Croatia, the Czech Republic and three additional countries 
(Macedonia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) where an observer might question the quality of the 
data. The five year average was above 10% in Romania, Serbia and the larger FSU 
countries (Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine), as well as most of Central Asia (except 
Kazakhstan) and a few other smaller FSU republics. 
 There is of course some variation in inflation experience among the 26 countries for 
which data are reported in Table 1. A few countries, which started some economic reforms 
in advance of the political transition, were able to avoid hyperinflation (Hungary, Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic).  In some countries the disinflation was dramatic. 
Croatia went from over 1000 per cent inflation to almost none in two years.  In others, the 
process was more gradual. The inflation rate in Hungary declined from 35 percent to 10 
percent over the course of a decade.
3 In still others, reforms were not immediately 
successful. In Bulgaria initial efforts at reform were unsuccessful and inflation returned 
with vengeance in 1997. However, the introduction of a currency board and the 
accompanying fiscal adjustment brought inflation down fairly quickly.  
Aggregating the data across the transition countries many of which are very small 
obscures the fact that inflation remains a problem in several large and important countries 
where fiscal discipline, financial reforms, extensive restructuring and genuine privatization 
have lagged. Specifically, the 2002 inflation rate was 16% in Russia, 22% in Romania, 
28% in Uzbekistan and 43% in Belarus and with only modest amounts of disinflation 
anticipated for 2003.  
  Another useful way to examine the disinflation is to look at the experiences that 
followed stabilization policies. Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) use the dating of transition 
stabilizations prepared by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998) and show how long it took to 
reach disinflation mileposts. Table 2 provides an update of the table with EBRD data on 
monthly inflation rates. There are two broad terms observations from the table. First, 
stabilization programs usually take hold very quickly. Second, after an initial burst the 
pace of disinflation slows down. A stabilization program brings inflation below 60% in 
about a year (the median for successful stabilizations is 13 months). The median time for Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
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inflation to fall from 60% to 30% is about 4 months. However, further progress in inflation 
reduction takes more time.  The median time for inflation to fall from 30% to 15% is 8 
months, and from 15% to 7.5%, one year. The initial disinflation experiences are almost all 
rapid. Stabilization programs always bring inflation below 60% in about two years or less. 
Further progress is sometimes delayed. In Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia 
stabilization programs failed and in Poland it took almost four years to bring inflation 
under 30%. In Hungary as well, an early successful stabilization program was followed by 
a slow disinflation, it took 8 years for inflation to reach 15%. Inflation less than 7.5% was 
not reached until developed country inflation levels consistently dropped below that level. 
So, the length of time to this final milestone depends largely on date when the 15% 
milestone was passed.  
  The inflation experiences in transition countries have been extensively summarized in 
the IMF Working paper by Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) and the CASE (Warsaw) report by 
Dabrowski (1999). Both of these papers reflect the amazement with which the successful 
disinflation programs were received. With a perspective of several more years, we both 
echo the amazement and note that the success of disinflation programs around the world 
are taken for granted. In addition to bringing some of the relevant observations up to date, 
it will be useful to evaluate the disinflation experience and comment on some relevant 
issues including whether low inflation is sustainable.  
  In the following sections we describe how the transition countries achieved 
disinflation. Next, we argue that inflation may have contributed positively to the necessary 
changes in relative prices. The third section argues that the recorded inflation may 
overstate the true inflation, and this problem was probably quite severe in the early years of 
transition. The fourth section has country studies for a small country with a rapid 
disinflation, Estonia, a rapidly growing transition country that disinflated gradually, 
Poland, a less successful disinflation story, Romania, and the largest transition country, 
Russia. Disinflation stories emphasize the choice of exchange rate regime and fiscal policy.  
We conclude that successful disinflation can occur with different approaches to the 
exchange rate but that fiscal discipline is a necessary condition for success. In the fifth 
section we examine the evidence on the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the transition 
countries. Empirical studies suggest that the transition countries will be likely to 
                                                                                                                                                    
3  There is much debate concerning the speed of disinflation in Hungary; see Olivier Blanchard (pro BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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experience real exchange rate appreciation as their income levels increase. However, the 
resulting inflation differentials with the rest of the world will not be very large. The sixth 
section offers concluding remarks.  
 
 
2  How did the transition countries disinflate?  
 
A discussion of disinflation in transition countries has to be divided into two parts, the end 
of high inflation and the end of moderate inflation.  As noted already, there are several 
studies of the former.  Not surprisingly, control of the fiscal deficit is given the strongest 
credit in econometric studies and case analyses of high inflation episodes.  There has been 
less analysis of the more recent experience with disinflation with the notable exception of 
Brada and Kutan (2002).    
  The initial stages of transition were accompanied by large fiscal deficits. Peak deficits 
in the general government balance were typically over 5% of GDP in the advanced 
transition countries and often much more in the FSU countries.
4   For example, the balance 
was over –10% in Bulgaria in 1993 and 1996,   –7.5% in Hungary in 1994,    -11.9% in 
Slovak Republic in 1992.   In the FSU countries were the collapse of output was larger and 
tax collections broke down, the deficits were even larger, almost 20% of GDP in Russia in 
1992 and more in the Ukraine.  There were some exceptions; the peak deficit reported for 
the Czech Republic was -3.1% of GDP in 1992 and Slovenia maintained a budget surplus 
in the early transition years.  All of these figures understate the true burden because quasi-
fiscal deficits in the form of government support to enterprises through central bank credit 
were large as well.  Nevertheless a hallmark of the disinflation era was that the deficits 
were reduced significantly.  In most countries, the deficits were less than 3% of GDP for 
several years running by 1997 with the exception of Hungary.  Improved fiscal balances in 
the mid 1990s reduced the expectation that deficits would be monetized and helped lower 
inflationary expectations.  The data on deficits understates the extent of progress on fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                    
faster disinflation) and Kornai (con) in Cottarelli and Szapary (1998). 
4  Measurement of the deficit is often imprecise, particularly in the early transition years as 
accounting standards changed. For example the government balance in Poland was reported as -
6.7% of GDP in 1991 and 1992 until recently when government figures were revised to -2.1% and 
-4.9% respectively.  Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
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reform because quasi-fiscal deficits are not measured.  Subsidies through directed credits 
and distorted prices (importantly the price of energy) disappeared as well.  Perhaps equally 
important was the development of a capacity for government deficit financing other than 
monetization.  Treasury bills were introduced in the advanced transition countries in the 
early 1990s and in the former Soviet Union in the mid- 1990s.  In addition, several 
countries were able to introduce government bonds with longer maturities by the end of the 
decade. Revenue from privatization has also been a relatively large source of financing. 
Even though large-scale privatization was completed in many transition countries by the 
mid-90s, sales of large infrastructure companies and banks continued after that.  
Although the capacity to absorb deficits without monetization has increased, the 
deficits have begun to increase as well.   By the end of the 1990s most of the countries of 
central Europe were running fiscal deficits in excess of 5% of GDP.  In 2003 the deficit 
reached  -6.7% of GDP in both Poland and the Czech Republic and  -9.2% in Hungary.  
Although there is no apparent inflationary impact, it may well emerge suddenly and 
powerfully.  Large deficits have not reemerged in the countries of the FSU.  Russia has a 
fiscal surplus, which is due as much to improving world commodity and energy prices as 
to policy changes.  
The other pillar of disinflation is monetary policy itself.  Of course, fiscal and monetary 
policies are related and an early review of disinflation in transition (Begg 1997) notes that 
monetary policy rarely succeeds if sound fiscal policy had not been established.  A money 
supply based disinflation to stop hyperinflation works because it is also a fiscal based 
disinflation when seignorage is the most important source of government revenue.  
Needless to say, disinflation was accompanied by reduced money expansion.  The 
interesting issue is how money expansion was kept under control.   Macro conditions were 
far too chaotic in the pre stabilization period to adopt either money aggregates targets or 
interest rate targets.  Large overhangs of forced saving meant that the initial money stocks 
were large.  Although early high inflation eroded the value of these stocks, support of both 
enterprises and the government through money creation led to rapid growth of money.  
Furthermore, successful disinflation led to a rebound in real money demand and increased 
intermediary activity.  Thus, money multipliers are variable and difficult to predict.  It 
would have been impossible to target money aggregates in this environment.   Any attempt 
to do so would not be credible.   Similarly, high and variable inflation made interest rate BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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targets equally impractical.  Moreover, money markets institutions and instruments for the 
application of interest rate targets did not exist at first.  
So, the exchange rate is the most obvious choice as a target for monetary policy.   
Although policy makers kept a careful watch on the exchange rate as the only reliable 
indicator of the success of efforts to disinflate, only a few countries adopted formal 
exchange rate targets.  For example Poland adopted a crawling peg exchange rate target in 
order to influence both policy and expectations.  Russia used a crawling peg from 1996 to 
1998 while it tried, ultimately unsuccessfully, to maintain an overvalued currency.  Estonia 
is exceptional; it adopted a hard peg early (June 1992) and was followed by the other two 
Baltic countries, Latvia and Lithuania, in 1994.  Many countries avoided a formal peg and 
many have moved towards floating exchange rates.   
This is surprising because formal exchange rate targets that are highly visible and 
effect prices directly through inflation pass through, can be very helpful in implementing a 
credible disinflation policy.   There are difficulties in choosing an appropriate exchange 
rate path that complicate the use of formal exchange rate targets.  First, capital flows can 
influence the nominal exchange rates and second, transition structural adjustments lead to 
changes in real exchange rates.  Thus, an explicit target might have as many advantages as 
disadvantages.  The number of transition countries with floating exchange rates increased 
over the 1990s.   
Monetary policy management of the inflation rate in many of the transition countries 
was complicated by the role of capital inflows.  Central banks usually absorb capital 
inflows in order to avoid currency appreciation and then sterilize the impact on the 
domestic monetary base.  However, there are limits on the ability of a central bank to 
sterilize.  First, sterilization is costly to a central bank that holds low interest earning 
foreign assets.  Second, it constrains the central bank balance sheet and might make it 
difficult to react to domestic financial sector shocks.    
The comparison of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic through the mid 1990s is 
instructive (see Roubini and Wachtel, 1999).  The commitment to a pegged exchange rate 
was strongest in the Czech Republic (the Koruna was pegged from 1991 to 1997), weakest 
in Hungary that had repeated devaluations and somewhat stronger in Poland where the 
crawling peg was carefully managed.  Inflation was highest in Hungary and lowest in the 
Czech Republic.  The Czech Republic had used a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
and cornerstone for its initial stabilization program.  However, real appreciation and Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
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problems financing the external imbalance were factors inhibiting Czech growth towards 
the end of the decade, and the exchange rate peg had to be abandoned in 1997 after a 
speculative attack.  
Thus, the surprising conclusion is that disinflation in transition economies took place 
while the predominant form of monetary targeting was policy judgment.  At the same time, 
a new approach to policy targeting was taking hold among the developed countries.  In the 
course of the 1990s, inflation targeting became all the rage and was picked up in the 
transition world as well.  At first the use of inflation targets was informal but by the end of 
the decade several transition countries formally adopted inflation targets.  This was only 
possible once inflation rates had subsided so that inflation forecasts over a medium term 
horizon could be taken seriously.  Jones and Mishkin (2003) describe the use of inflation 
targets in the Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic dropped its 
nominal anchor for a floating exchange rate in 1997.  This left monetary policy without 
any target to help reduce the inflation rate and at the end of the year, the central bank 
formally adopted inflation targets.  
Inflation targets have the distinct advantage in that they avoid the pitfalls of the 
traditional monetary targets – interest rates, exchange rates or monetary aggregates.   
Moreover, the few years of experience with inflation targets around the world are 
promising.  In addition, adopting inflation targets can lead to more transparent and more 
consistent communication from the central bank about policy, which helps establish 
credibility.  However, there are two observations to bear in mind.  First, missed inflation 
targets can lead to either abrupt, and perhaps, ill advised changes in policy.
5   Although 
everyone agrees that inflation targets should not be a straight jacket, there might be a loss 
of credibility to a transition country central bank that ignores overshooting that goes on 
beyond its stipulated policy horizon.  Second, the apparent success of inflation targeting by 
transition countries cannot easily be distinguished from the influence of EU accession 
since all of the transition inflation targeters are also accession countries.   Transition 
central bankers, particularly in Poland, may soon encounter the pitfalls that result from 
rigid targets that are missed.  Poland adopted inflation targets in 1998 and continued to 
utilize a crawling band exchange rate target for policy operations until April 2000 when a 
floating regime was announced. The original short term inflation targets were 2 percentage 
                                                 
5  This is basically the reason why the Greenspan Fed resists the formal use of inflation targets.   BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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points wide but in 2002 the bank specified a target of 5% with a permissible fluctuation 
band of 1 percentage point.  According to the OECD (2002, p.41): “The Bank hopes that 
by emphasizing its desire to achieve a specific level of inflation as opposed to an outcome 
within a range, its communications will be better able to affect expectations.”  This seems 
to be a dangerous strategy for a transition economy where non-market structural forces 
continue to effect inflation and for a small open economy where external shocks have large 
effects (although Poland is clearly the largest and least open of the accession countries).  
The bank does say that in event of a missed target, policy will be aimed at moving towards 
the medium term rather than the short term target.   
As noted already, all of the transition countries that have adopted inflation targets are 
accession candidates and the influence of expectations about accession is probably more 
important than the use of a particular policy approach over the last few years. It is too early 
to disentangle these simultaneous developments.   Success in seeking EU membership is 
also probably correlated with a further prerequisite for inflation targeting, i.e. institutional 
capability. For inflation targeting to be effective, the central bank must be able to forecast 
inflation and gauge the effects of its own actions. This requires an adequate number of 
highly skilled staff, which simply was not available in the earlier years of transition but EU 
accession has led to rapid development of institutional capabilities with support from 
international institutions and without domestic political resistance.  
For many years it has been fashionable to attribute successful macroeconomic 
outcomes to central bank independence.  Although the original econometric evidence has 
been criticized, it is still an interesting indicator.  Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) 
look at the characteristics of central banks in transition economies.  The central banks 
established in the transition economies score very well on various indexes of institutional, 
policy and legal independence when compared to other developing countries and even 
when compared to developed country central banks in the 1980s.  Moreover, the central 
banks established later are institutionally stronger.   Some early studies (Dabrowski, 1999) 
concluded that central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates but 
Cukierman et. al. indicates that the relationship is weak in the initial stages of transition 
when price decontrol dominates.  However, in later stages when liberalization is sustained, 
there is somewhat less inflation with a more independent central bank. Improvements in 
institutional structure and disinflation took place simultaneously.  In the transition 
countries and probably elsewhere as well, central bank independence is endogenous.   Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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  Since 1999, inflation rates in a majority of transition countries have been at developed 
country levels.  One explanation is that monetary and fiscal discipline and improvements in 
institutional structure (e.g. inflation targets, independent central banks) have convincingly 
established the disinflation bona fides of transition policy makers.  An alternative 
explanation might attribute this to positive external shocks that are specific to this episode.  
Brada and Kutan (2002) conclude that the most recent disinflation was due to positive 
shocks rather than the development of sound monetary and fiscal policy institutions and 
policies.   
  In this view, tight monetary policy through the 1990s only served to offset the lack of 
progress on true fiscal reform.  Even if measured fiscal deficits declined, off balance sheet 
subsidies and unfunded liabilities constitute large longer run fiscal problems. Moreover, 
monetary policy in the advanced transition economies in the mid and late 1990s was 
inherently unstable.  As noted above the Czech Republic quickly moved from various 
exchange rate pegs to floating to inflation targeting as it groped for an effective policy tool.  
As a result, the reduction in inflation in the late 1990s was due to something other than the 
influence of a credible and stable monetary policy target.  Brada and Kutan conclude that 
an external shock, the decline in import prices, particularly energy, rather than any shift in 
monetary regime was the source of the later disinflation.  Since tradables can account for 
as much as two-thirds of the components of the CPI, the shock can have a major influence 
on inflation rates.    
This discussion serves to temper our amazement with the extent of disinflation in 
transition.  It might well be premature to declare victory over inflation in the advanced 
transition countries for several reasons.  First, the external shock from import prices is 
transitory.  Second, the fiscal deficits in these countries have been worsening and are in 
several places as large as they have ever been.  Finally, there has not been a long enough 
period of management with inflation targets to create an environment where inflation 
expectations are really quiescent.     
However, there is one wild card in this discussion.  It is the influence of EU accession.  
In 1993, the EU’s Copenhagen declaration stated that CEE transition countries “that so 
desire shall become members of the EU.”  This vague commitment to expansion became 
reality in 1998 when negotiations with the accession countries started and culminated with 
the announcement in October 2002 of the first round accession countries.  Eight transition 
countries will become part of the EU in May 2004 and two more expect to finish BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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negotiations and join in 2007. In addition, most of these countries expect to be part of the 
Euro area as well.
6   Several countries of central Europe that were left out of the first round 
of accession talks (e.g. Croatia) and some countries of the FSU (e.g. Ukraine) expect to be 
included in a second round of EU enlargement that follows soon.  The consensus, among 
the countries already in and the transition candidates is that the economic and monetary 
integration of Europe will go forward rapidly.  Monetary integration poses additional 
problems because price level convergence might generate inflation in some parts of the 
Euro area.   
The anticipation of European integration had a strong influence on inflation, 
particularly after negotiations commenced in 1998.  First, the high and increasing 
likelihood of accession led to the expectation that inflation would move towards European 
levels.  This effect of European integration may well be the single most important 
influence on inflation.  Second, the enormous emphasis on accession enabled policy 
makers to maintain a tight monetary policy in order to adjust to standards in the Euro area.  
Any slowdown in future accession plans or decision to limit the extent of the EU could 
result in inflation problems for those countries that are affected.  Similarly, Russia and the 
other republics of the FSU which do not expect to become part of the EU and still have 
double digit inflation rate will have to rely on domestic policies and institutions to reduce 
inflation expectations.  In addition, these countries may not have the same incentive to 
bring inflation to single digit levels and may choose to emphasize other domestic priorities.  
A successful disinflation should not just result in low inflation, it should also be 
credible and accompanied by long term expectations that inflation will not recur.  An 
indication of long term credibility is a willingness to hold domestic money, liquid assets 
denominated in the local currency.  Monetization ratios are low throughout the region 
because of weakly developed financial systems (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003) but increases in 
the ratio are an indicator of confidence in the financial system and the stability of prices.  
Table 3 shows monetization ratios (M2/GDP) in 1995 and 2001 for transition countries.  
They are increasing except in countries where successful stabilization had not occurred by 
1995 (Bulgaria, Belarus, and Romania).  Higher monetization ratios are found in the more 
advanced transition countries that stabilized earlier on although the increases in the late 
                                                 
6  For example, Estonia has indicated that it will join the monetary union at the earliest possible 
date, 2007. The Czech authorities have acknowledged that their membership in the monetary union 
will be delayed by some years because of the current high fiscal deficit.  Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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1990s varied.  The ratio in the Czech Republic declined a bit and in Hungary it went up by 
about one-tenth while in Estonia and Slovenia the increases were quite large.  
  
 
 3  Did inflation do its job? 
 
Perhaps one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of the formerly planned 
economies was the extent to which prices were distorted.  Restrictions on trade and 
domestic allocation mechanisms kept the prices of even internationally traded commodities 
from reaching their world market prices.  And the prices of domestically produced goods 
were set administratively and could venture far from what they would be if allowed to 
follow market forces.  Thus, the removal of controls and price setting arrangements led to a 
rapid change in prices.  The removal of price restraints and the large overhang of liquid 
balances led to the immediate outbreak of inflation.   Generally, the initial outburst of 
inflation was due to the following causes: 
 
•  Removal of price controls, constraints and administered price setting 
•   Seignorage financing of government  
•   Credit expansion to support government enterprises 
•  Spending of forced saving, i.e. monetary overhang. 
 
The initial outbursts of high inflation, often at hyperinflation rates, imposed large 
economic costs. First, the value of financial savings erodes.  Second, the support of 
inefficient enterprises continues. Third, hyperinflation inhibits the effective operation of 
the payments system. But there is also one possible way in which inflation, even at 
relatively high levels can be beneficial. The inflationary environment allows and 
encourages the adjustment of relative prices. In discussions of moderate inflation in 
developed countries, the costs and benefits of inflation have been called the ‘sand’ and 
‘grease’ effects (Groshen and Schweitzer, 1997). The sand in the wheels of the price 
system occurs because inflation is associated with forecast errors so that even in a 
competitive system there are mistakes in price setting and distortions to relative prices.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2004 
 
  20 
The grease effect occurs because inflation reduces the costs of making price adjustments 
and facilitates changes in relative prices when some prices are rigid downwards.   
The ‘job’ of inflation in transition was to provide the grease for price setting and bring 
about adjustments in relative prices.  Is there evidence that relative price adjustments took 
place and that the structure of prices become less distorted?  Did inflation do its job? 
There are only a few studies that have looked at this issue indirectly by examining the 
degree of price variability or the extent of price level convergence.   The thrust of the 
evidence is that a large amount of price level adjustment took place early in the transition 
process but that the amount of adjustment has slowed down while there are still large 
differences in the structure of prices between the transition economies and the developed 
economies.  The differences that persist are related to both non-market determinants of 
prices and productivity differentials between traded and non-traded goods sectors (the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect that will be discussed later).  
Coorey, Mecagni and Offerdal (1998) look at relative price variability measures such 
as the variance and skewness of inflation rates across price index components.  They find 
that relative price variability is associated with the level of the inflation rates, a finding 
established for developed countries already.   Although, it is difficult to disentangle the 
direction of causality between inflation rates and relative price variability, there are some 
inferences that can be drawn for the transition economies.  First, the data suggests that the 
variance among price index components is both particularly high in transition countries 
relative to developed economies, and also higher early in the transition process.  In 
particular, there are spikes in relative price variability when the initial price liberalizations 
occur and there is evidence of causality from relative price variability to inflation.
7  
Although, the inflation in transition countries was clearly due to standard causes as well 
(money growth, wage pressures, etc.), price shocks from liberalization seem to play a 
significant role.  
Wozniak (chapter 10 in Dabrowski, 2003) looks at disaggregated price movements in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and reaches very similar conclusions.  Relative 
price changes had an impact on initial inflation rates, particularly in Poland where the 
initial distortions were greatest.  Through, the mid 1990s, the gradual relaxing of 
administered price adjustments influenced inflation rates in all countries with the biggest 
                                                 
7  A disaggregated analysis of price changes in Poland (Wozniak, 1998) confirms this. Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
 
  21 
effects in Hungary.  There continues to be considerable debate among policy makers about 
the optimal speed and magnitude of price liberalizations.   
An association between spikes in price changes due to liberalization and the overall 
inflation rate has an interesting implication.  Efforts to disinflate with standard policy tools 
might be a mistake if low inflation will delay relative price changes, which suggest that 
there is an added cost to disinflation in transition economies.  That is, disinflation might 
have real costs if it delays relative price adjustments.  Recall that most transition 
economies ended hyperinflation very quickly but then took several years to bring inflation 
below 10%.  At the time this was faulted as the result of an unwillingness to maintain a 
credibly tight monetary and fiscal policy.  However, it may well have been the correct 
strategy to follow because a moderately high inflation rate allows relative price 
adjustments to continue.  Thus, the long periods of time shown in Table 2 to bring inflation 
from 60% to 15% per year in many advanced transition countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, 
and the Baltics) may have been in retrospect a better policy than the very rapid 
disinflations in some countries. Of course, this argument assumes that at least some prices 
are rigid downwards. 
There is some indication from Table 4a that the countries with slower disinflations 
have undergone a greater overall price level adjustment.  The price levels relative to OECD 
averages are higher in Poland and Hungary than in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
although the Czech Republic has the highest GDP per capita.
8   The latter two countries did 
not experience ‘enough’ inflation to make as much overall price adjustment.  However, the 
extent to which price levels in the transition countries are still very different from the 
OECD averages is shown in Table 4b.  In particular goods prices have adjusted much more 
than service prices, particularly government services.  There are also large country-to-
country differences in the adjustments. 
Thus, the answer to the question posed – ‘did inflation do its job?’ - is probably 
‘somewhat.’  Although liberalization of controlled prices contributed to inflation early on, 
not all prices were liberalized in the initial phases.  Many prices are yet to be liberalized.  
As a result, for the implementation of inflation targeting the Czech National Bank uses a 
measure called “net inflation” that removes the influence of administered prices until they 
                                                 
8   In 2002 Czech per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis was 62% of the EU-15 
average.  Corresponding figures for Hungary, Slovak Republic and Poland were 53%, 47% and 
41% respectively.  Usually relative price levels and per capita income are closely correlated. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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are liberalized.  Even in this advanced transition economy, about one-fifth of the CPI is 
netted out.  Finally, price levels are still very far away from developed country experience.  
So, even in the most advanced transition countries, there is still a lot of adjustment to go 
on. 
Disaggregated price movements in transition countries are clearly relevant to 
understanding the future of moderate inflation in transition countries.  Stabilization policies 
are important but they do not tell the whole story.  Some recent research on Albania, where 
conventional stabilization policy reduced inflation in the mid 1990s, presents a cautionary 
tale (Rother 2000, Domac and Elbirt, 1998).   Monetary restraint, exchange rate pass 
through and, to a lesser extent, fiscal restraint led to rapid disinflation (Domac and Elbirt, 
1998). However, the disinflation path was not smooth and hyperinflation almost returned 
in 1997 as a result of political pressures for looser policies in 1996 and the affect of the 
pyramid schemes on the financial sector.   There is another part of the inflation story in 
Albania, the influence of price controls and disaggregated price movements.  Although 
about one-half of prices were liberalized in 1992, many controls still exist.    Rother’s VAR 
analysis shows that the skewness of the distribution of price increases influences inflation.   
Thus, with very low inflation rates, further price liberalizations can introduce significant 
inflationary shocks.  Thus, Albania may find itself in the quandary where it can maintain 
low inflation (the 1999-2002 average was about 2%) or complete the process of market 
liberalization but not do both simultaneously. Inflation targets can be too low if they do not 
allow for the accommodation of inflation shocks from liberalization or other sources.   
These observations could apply to many of the less advanced transition economies where 
disinflation may have been too successful.   Aggregate policy and external shocks may 
have brought inflation down to levels that cannot accommodate the price liberalizations 




4  Can we believe the numbers? 
 
Inflation mismeasurement and biases in calculated inflation rates are frequent topic of 
discussion in developed countries.  The 1996 Boskin report in the U.S. provided explicit 
estimates of the biases in the CPI.  Since that time the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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improved both the measurement of prices and the calculation of inflation rates.  
Improvements include obtaining prices from new discount outlets.  In addition, the index 
calculation now allows for regular changes in expenditure weights.  In the Euro area there 
were similar concerns and efforts to improve price measurement with the establishment of 
the HICP (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices).  However, mismeasurement of prices 
in the less developed economies is rarely discussed.  As long as the focus of interest is on a 
disinflation that brings inflation from, for example, 1000% to 10%, the quality of the data 
is not a central concern.  But, with inflation rates consistently below 10% and with 
increased interest in cross country comparisons and small changes in the inflation trend, 
the quality of the data being examined is worth considering.  Moreover, reliable measures 
of price indexes are essential for determining changes in real income.   
Not surprisingly, there are some important reasons why inflation measures in the 
transition economies might be subject to serious mismeasurement.  Filer and Hanousek 
(2003) summarize their extensive project at CERGE in Prague on inflation bias in the 
Czech Republic and some other transition countries.  In the Czech Republic, the major 
source of bias is the failure to account for quality improvements in goods sold and the 
entrance of new goods onto the market.  Substitution bias from the use of fixed weight 
indices and outlet substitution due to new markets also contribute to the measured bias.  
Their estimates change somewhat over time and with different assumptions but seem fairly 
robust.  At least one-third of the measured average inflation rates in the Czech Republic 
(about 10% per year) are due to measurement bias.
9  The implications of this are large.  
Real growth (with GDP deflated by the measured CPI) over the decade was –0.7% per 
year.  With inflation properly measured to correct for the estimated biases, the growth rate 
was +3.6%. A common way of measuring transition progress is to look at real GDP 
relative to its pre-transition (1989) level.  In 1999, the EBRD data (EBRD, 2000) indicate 
that only three transition countries had regained the 1989 level – Poland, Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia. By 2001, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Albania and Uzbekistan were added 
to the list.  With substantial price change compounded over 10 or more years, small errors 
                                                 
9  The Boskin report for the U.S. provides similar results.  The overall bias in the inflation rate is 
about 1.2% per year with an average inflation rate of 2.8%.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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in index measurement can lead to substantially different conclusions.  The story might be 
substantially different with more accurate measurement of price changes.
10  
  Filer and Hanousek provide some direct evidence that indicates that economic well 
being has improved more than the real GDP data suggest because inflation is overstated.  
They conducted focus groups to determine how consumers would allocate price change to 
inflation as opposed to quality change.  They did this by asking Czech consumers how 
much they would pay at the current time for a brand new 1990 good.  Their results indicate 
that much more of the observed price change should be attributed to quality change than 
the official CPI does.  For example, clothing prices went up more than two and half times 
over the decade.  The index attributes about 30% of this to quality change so that the CPI 
for clothing more than doubled.  However, when consumer perceptions are used to 
measure quality improvements, the price increase is only about 50%.   
The measurement problems will in all likelihood diminish with time as national 
authorities follow internationally accepted norms and improve their data collection 
procedures.  In addition, with moderate inflation the biases do not create such large 
distortions.  However, economic historians looking back on the transition decade will be 
well advised to keep this discussion in mind.  
  
 
5  Disinflation: Case studies 
 
The experience with disinflation in the two dozen or so transition countries, all in the same 
decade, provides a useful laboratory to study disinflation policies.  Are there particular 
types of policies that worked better?  Which policies seemed to have generated the 
successful disinflations?  Or in other words, how did they do it? A convenient way of 
addressing these issues is to look at policy history in a few countries.  Following de Menil 
(2003), we will look at Poland and Romania and also examine Estonia and Russia.  
 
Disinflation in Poland.   The Polish government introduced a stabilization program, the 
Balcerowicz Plan, on New Year’s Day 1990 in an economy already suffering from high 
                                                 
10   Of course, the measurement of real GDP is fraught with difficulties as well.  In the pre-
transition era it was probably overstated and in the early transition years the output declines were 
very large because activity in the informal sector was overlooked.  Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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inflation (the monthly inflation rate peaked at about 50% in 1989).  The Polish zloty was 
devalued to half its initial exchange rate and pegged to the dollar.  Both monetary and 
fiscal policies were drastically tightened and credit creation stopped immediately.  State 
subsidies were withdrawn, price controls removed, foreign direct investment encouraged 
and privatization programs started.   A large decline in production followed, forcing the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) to ease monetary policy later in 1990, only to retighten a 
few months later. Inflation shot up and the recession intensified. The zloty was devalued 
again and a crawling peg was adopted.  The hyperinflation had abated but inflation was 
still high.  The intention was to gradually reduce the rate of crawl in order to control 
inflation expectations.   
Over the next several years monetary and fiscal policy alternated between 
expansionary and contractionary episodes as the government tried to cope with 
unemployment problems, impose hard budget constraints on the government and 
enterprises and recapitalize the banking system.  Although there were fits and starts to the 
stabilization, the commitment to the crawling peg as a form of inflation target was 
deliberate and purposeful.   From 1991 to 1998 the crawl was reduced from a monthly rate 
of 1.8% to 0.5%, the bands were widened and inflation came down gradually.  The 
nominal peg decreased in importance due to the widening of fluctuation bands and the 
NBP adopted inflation targeting in 1998, aiming for around 7 percent inflation.  The targets 
were not met in 1998 and 1999 and the NBP risked losing its hard earned credibility.  
Monetary policy was eased slightly and the gains from disinflation dissipated as inflation 
reached double digits again. 
  In April 2000, the monetary authorities adopted a floating exchange rate regime, and 
set out a goal of bringing inflation down to below 4 percent by the end of 2003. During the 
second half of 2000, real interest rates rose as the zloty appreciated against the euro and the 
dollar. The September 2001 terrorist attack against the United States further contributed to 
the appreciation of the zloty. The strong real appreciation of the currency had led the 
central bank to substantially tighten monetary policy. This environment of tight money and 
a slowdown in European demand led to a sharp fall in investment activity, causing to an 
overall slowdown of the economy. It did bring about a reduction in inflation to about 5 
percent in 2001.   
  The story of Polish transition and stabilization can be read in several ways.  First, the 
disinflation was extremely slow; it took a full decade to bring inflation below 5%.  Second, BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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although growth in most recent years has been robust and Poland is often viewed as the 
most successful transition country, there is still substantial unemployment.  Although 
recent GDP growth is strong, there are persistent problems such as high wages in state 
owned industries and persistent unemployment.  The NBP has had over a decade of 
experience with nominal anchors.  It began with a fixed peg, changed to a credible 
crawling peg and finally switched to an inflation target as the anchor.  The rapid decline 
inflation at the very end of the 1990s might be due to the credibility of the NBP’s inflation 
targeting program or to the influence of EU accession on inflation expectations.   
An evaluation of the experience with inflation targets must be mixed. Inflation 
overshot the target bands as soon as they were introduced and then undershot them for two 
year is succession.  As the OECD (2002, p.43) notes “the principal advantage of an 
inflation targeting regime over alternative anchors for monetary policy is its capacity to 
affect expectations.”  The NBP backs up its inflation target regime with a regular reporting 


































































Inflation expectations may well have come down considerably but recent macroeconomic 
developments do not support the sustainability of very low inflation rates.  In response to a Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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weak economy, monetary policy was significantly looser in 2002 than earlier.  Short-term 
interest rates went from a peak in early 2001 of 19% to 8% in mid 2002 while the inflation 
rate went from around 7 % to 2%.  Moreover, the fiscal deficit is more almost 7% of GDP 
and the structural reforms that are needed to change the fiscal stance have slowed down.  
Finally, the zloty has depreciated against the euro, which will inevitably affect inflation in 
the future.  Although Poland has had access to international financial markets since the mid 
1990s, its Standard and Poor’s long-term foreign currency credit rating has been BBB+ 
since 2000.  The macroeconomic fundamentals are strong enough to make the future for 
inflation in Poland uncertain.  
 
Disinflation in Romania.   The history of transition in Romania contrasts with that in 
Poland.   As de Menil (2003, p.283) comments “the dominant impression…of the first ten 
years of transition in Romania…is one of difficulty.  The period was marked by a 
succession of crises….”   Romania is the only central European transition country that has 
not accomplished an effective disinflation program.  There are two features of macro 
policy that have resulted in this outcome.  First, although the formal structure of a 
reformed banking system dates to 1991, Romanian monetary and banking policy made the 
banks the automatic supplier of financial resources for state owned enterprises. Second, 
controls over domestic prices and control over foreign exchange transactions continued to 
be significant influences throughout the decade.   
A stabilization program was introduced in 1993 as inflation reached 290 percent and 
output fell by 30 percent. Although monetary policy was tightened, the currency devalued 
and price controls substantially reduced, the program was a short lived success because it 
was not accompanied by further structural reforms.  Romania purposefully adopted a 
gradual approach to reform in order to ensure social support for the transition.  From 1994-
1996, Romania experienced a volatile economic environment—a period characterized by 
positive growth but also high inflation (averaging 50 percent during the three year span), in 
addition to growing macroeconomic imbalances. 
The gradualist approach did nothing to reduce subsidies to the unprofitable agriculture 
and energy sectors. The central bank provided liquidity to the state owned banks that lent 
heavily to these sectors.  Monetary policy was inherently accommodating because of the 
deterioration of the financial situation, causing persistent inflationary pressures. It was BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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almost impossible for the Romanian central bank to pursue any effective monetary policy 
as its actions were constrained by the government’s economic policy.  
  Because of the lack of any meaningful anti-inflation instruments, the government tried 
to control inflation through price controls and foreign exchange transactions. Although it 
helped to decrease inflation from 61 percent to 27 percent from 1994 to 1995, postponing 
the necessary prices adjustments to stem inflation proved unsustainable in the long run.  In 
the absence of any significant enterprise restructuring or change in bank behavior, 
unsustainable fiscal deficits continued and the country was back in crisis by 1996.   
  At the end of 1996, a new government came to power, set on implementing a bolder 
approach to reform. It broke with the gradualist approach and dramatically accelerated the 
process of structural reforms. Prices and the foreign exchange market were fully 
liberalized. Tariffs were reduced, and subsidies for loss-making state enterprises were 
removed. The reforms also gradually reduced directed credits to the agricultural sector. 
The government sold 60 percent of the companies from the State Ownership Fund in one 
year to drastically accelerate privatization. The policy of using the central bank as the main 
provider of credit to the real sector ended immediately.  
  The transition shock in Romania really occurred in early 1997; output fell sharply and 
inflation soared to 150%.  Large state-owned enterprises were among the most affected, as 
they had previously benefited from easy financing. The government postponed its planned 
large-scale restructuring of large state-owned enterprises and the NBR relaxed monetary 
policy.  
  While the 1997 stabilization program failed its primary objectives, it did free up prices 
and correct the exchange rate. The conduct of monetary policy had been complicated by 
very high interest rate volatility driven by fluctuations in Treasury bill issuance, the 
occasional need to act as a lender of last resort to state banks, the country’s weak balance 
of payment position, and the need to build up foreign reserves. The NBR pursued a 
moderate real exchange rate appreciation to temporarily help disinflation.  
By the end of 1998, inflation was down to 41 percent, largely driven by real appreciation 
of the exchange rate.  However, the East Asian and Russian financial crises inhibited 
further progress.  Romania had difficulty financing its external deficit and in early 1999, 
came close to a payment crisis due to excessively low foreign reserves and an inability to 
refinance debts.  Exchange rate depreciation and fear of sovereign default kept interest 
rates high.  Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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  The NBR continued to focus on exchange rate policy in 2000 because it feared 
productivity gains would be lost through excessive real exchange rate appreciation. 
Inflation fell below its 1998 level, yet remained stubbornly high at 40 percent. In July, the 
central bank, finally free from budget and real sector financing, announced a tighter 
monetary policy stance.  Fiscal reforms have reduced off-budget spending and improved 
tax collections and so the deficit in 2002 was only 3% of GDP, relatively low for the 
transition countries.  Inflation went down to 17 percent by the end of 2002 and continues to 
decline slowly.  Romania was as a latecomer to transition reforms since two tries at 
stabilization were needed.  As a consequence the fundamentals point to further reduction in 
inflation rates. 
  Romanian experience illustrates the pitfalls of half-hearted reforms. Disinflation was 
extremely slow and uneven because fiscal policy was not brought under control;   





























































Disinflation in Estonia.   Inflation reached 1000 percent soon after Estonia declared its 
independence from the Soviet Union in October 1991 and began its national existence 
under very precarious circumstances.  The national currency, the kroon, was introduced in 
June 1992 and a currency board arrangement was put in place.  At the same time, an 
ambitious program of price liberalization began.  Further, 80 percent of the country's state-BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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owned small businesses were sold off in two years, and there were three rounds of large-
scale privatization with foreign participation for major enterprises.  
  The currency board fixed the kroon exchange to the German mark. The kroon was fully 
convertible and central bank liabilities were fully backed by foreign exchange reserves.  
Loans to the government by the Bank of Estonia were prohibited, and the bank was not to 
be liable for the state’s financial obligations. The currency board arrangement was chosen 
to gain credibility and provide a solid nominal anchor for restructuring.  
After the monetary reform, hyperinflation continued for a few months before the first 
effects of the reform were seen in rapidly declining inflation level. By the end of 1993, 
inflation had drastically declined from four digits in the past year to 41 percent.  Inflation 
rates continued to decline steadily over the next five years, but it was not until May 1998 
that inflation reached single-digit levels.  Inflation has averaged less than 4% over the last 
five years.  
The currency board provided a credible nominal anchor and enforced fiscal discipline.  
As a result it is responsible for the successful disinflation.  However, the currency has 
appreciated in real terms, which can create problems for any fixed exchange rate regime. A 
very large current account deficit may threaten the stability of the regime although the 
economy has been able to finance them without difficulty.  
Price increases are also somewhat higher in Estonia compared to those in advanced 
economies due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  That is higher productivity growth in 
Estonia due to real convergence yields convergence of the structure and level of prices as 
well. Thus the Balassa-Samuelson effect is estimated to cause inflation difference of about 
2 percentage points compared to inflation in advanced economies (Randveer 2000).   Thus, 
it is unclear whether there has been too much real appreciation. Also, the initial value of 
the kroon was probably undervalued by design.   
The currency board arrangement has been the cornerstone of a successful disinflation 
in Estonia.  Nevertheless, fixed exchange rate regimes inhibit responses to shock and it is 
well known that the time to exit such a regime is well before any shock occurs.  So, far the 
Estonian economy has proven to be very flexible.   For example, the 1998 Russian crises 
caused only a temporary fall in output. 
 Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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Disinflation in Russia.   As the Soviet Union was disintegrating, the old command structure 
of the economy deteriorated. This led to disruption of deliveries and distribution and 
consequently production had started to decline already under Gorbachev.  The decline was 
further exacerbated after the abortive coup of August 1991 and the break up of the Soviet 
Union.   Russia began a stabilization program with a large-scale liberalization of prices, 
which, it was hoped, would quickly lead to improved incentives for producers. Other 
reform measures like privatization were slated to follow later. 
  When the majority of consumer prices were liberalized at the beginning of January 
1992,
11 the Russian price level jumped immediately upwards. This was not surprising 
because many Soviet era consumer prices did not even cover production costs and the 
Russian consumers were willing spend their large accumulated stock of monetary assets 
from Soviet era forced savings.  Liberalization worked as predicted; consumer goods 
reappeared, prices increased and the value of the money overhang fell.   
  Monthly inflation rates in early 1992 oscillated between 10% and 35% and relative 
prices changed drastically.  A stabilization of sorts seemed to be working as monthly 
inflation rates declined to below 10% in the summer of 1992.  However, at the same time 
production continued its fall, and public finances were in disarray.  
  Political pressures to halt the decline in production increased. Also, a new central bank 
management was much more sympathetic towards central bank financing of public deficits 
and credits both to the government and to enterprises accelerated. This had an almost 
                                                 
11   Prices for most public goods, e.g. energy, were not liberalized and rents remained 
administratively set. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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immediate effect on inflation, and by the end of 1992 monthly inflation rate was again over 
25%. 
   Monetary policy in Russia was complicated by the existence of the ruble zone. After 
the Soviet Union disintegrated, the ruble continued to be the currency in most of its 
successor states for some time and  rules concerning the issuance of money were at best 
unclear. In practice, most former Soviet Union republics expanded the ruble money supply 
at a rapid pace to cover their budget deficits, which  affected  inflation in the entire ruble 
area. The ruble area dissolved mainly during 1993, when most successor states introduced 
their own national currencies (Odling-Smee and Pastor, 2001).  
  An effort at restabilization occurred in 1994 when the Russian parliament approved a 
budget with a clearly smaller deficit and Russia was able to restart its program with the 
IMF.  Inflation expectations abated and the ruble stabilized. In the summer of 1994 
monthly inflation was under 5% for the first time since the start of transition.  However, by 
the autumn it became apparent that the government would be unable to resist demands for 
budget financing.  Currency markets recognized this, and in October 1994 the ruble 
depreciated approximately 20% in one day. Consequently, inflation jumped again to more 
than 15% per month.  In the end, federal government deficit for 1994 was more than 10%, 
much larger than in 1993.  Although inflation was lower, it was still around 300% for the 
year.  
  At the beginning of 1995 the Russian authorities were ready for another stabilization 
attempt.  Structural reforms were started and authorities were willing to cut expenditures in 
order to reduce the public sector deficit. Again, the IMF was ready to provide financing 
under a new program. The Central Bank of Russia adopted an informal crawling peg 
policy, and the rate of depreciation was chosen to be smaller than the prevailing inflation 
rate. Therefore gradual real appreciation of the ruble would be used as a tool for 
disinflation. Because Russia was dollarized to such a high degree, an external anchor was 
deemed important for influencing inflationary expectations. Russia did cut the federal 
government deficit almost in half 1995.  By the end of 1995 the monthly inflation rate was 
consistently below 5%. However, in the run-up to presidential elections in the summer of 
1996 public expenditures were increased again, and tax evasion accelerated. But this time 
the central bank was not forced to finance the deficit, as Russian government had gained 
access to capital markets. Russia was able to sell bonds, denominated both in rubles and 
dollars, and to both foreign and domestic investors. In 1996, although the federal Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
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government deficit was 9.4% of GDP, the inflation declined to under 50% and fell into the 
teens in 1997.  It seemed that the transition adjustments had taken place successfully.  
  Russia’s fiscal difficulties reemerged in 1998 for two related reasons.  First, tax 
collections lagged as domestic reforms faltered and second, the Asian emerging markets 
crisis made investors more cautious and financing of the deficit increasingly difficult.   
Russia’s risk premium in the international bond markets shot up and although a new 
program with the IMF was agreed upon in July, it soon proved to be inadequate.  In August 
Russia had to let the ruble float and declare moratorium on its debts. Monetary and 
exchange rate policies had been unable to contain inflation, because fiscal policy was not 
on sustainable path.  Following the large devaluation of the ruble inflation shot up again, 
and immediately after the crisis monthly inflation was over 35%.  
However, the reversal was short lived and, surprisingly, by the beginning of 1999 monthly 
inflation was again clearly below 5%. There are several reasons for this favorable 
development. After the devaluation Russian authorities were fairly quick in stabilizing the 
external value of the ruble, partly with the help of capital controls.  Capital controls 
prevented the reemergence of foreign lending to Russian banks and thus helped curb the 
growth of domestic credit.  Also, the fiscal deficit was curtailed dramatically, as Russia 
had stopped servicing almost all of its debt.  Later in 1999 (and beyond) sharply higher oil 
prices improved Russia’s terms of trade substantially. As Russian government derives a 
substantial part of its tax revenue from the energy sector
12, this terms of trade shock had a 
very positive effect on Russia’s fiscal position.  Fiscal surpluses beginning in 2000 have 
helped to keep annual inflation rates below 20% in the recent years.  Also, Russia has 
returned to a policy of crawling peg, where the ruble depreciates fairly steadily against the 
dollar. The crawling peg regime provides a nominal anchor and this time fiscal policy is 
consistent with the exchange rate regime. 
  Although inflation is now low by Russia’s historical standard and is fairly stable as 
well, Russia is the one transition country where a successful stabilization program has not 
brought inflation down to developed country levels.  Although, high oil prices have 
contributed to a substantial current account surplus, the Central Bank of Russia has not 
been willing to let the ruble appreciate, as this would make many Russian manufacturers 
less competitive. Also, the central bank does not have adequate monetary policy tools to BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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sterilize the capital inflows, and therefore persistent inflation is the natural response. The 
Central Bank of Russia will most probably try to push down inflation only gradually. And 
as long as the Russian government is able to maintain its present fiscal stance, the central 






6  Is inflation inevitable in transition? 
 
The story of inflation in transition countries is not just a tale of wild hyperinflation 
following a structural change that was followed by an astounding ability to disinflate.   
There are aspects of the transition process that inevitably lead to inflation.  These issues are 
becoming more important now that the overall disinflation has been so successful.  As we 
have seen, inflation rates are at ‘western’ levels in many transition countries.  Now an 
                                                                                                                                                    
12 Tax evasion is more difficult in this sector than elsewhere because oil flows through pipelines 
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important issue faced by policy makers is whether the Euro inflation rate is the appropriate 
target or whether inflation somewhat greater than in Europe is the appropriate and realistic 
target.  In this event, efforts to maintain too low an inflation rate can lead to recession.  In 
this section we will examine the reasons why some inflation is inevitable and appropriate 
in transition.  
Inflation might be inevitable in transition due to structural adjustments, income 
convergence and Balassa-Samuelson effects.  The size of the inflation differential is 
particularly important in the countries that want to join the euro area in the near future. 
Higher inflation, resulting from income convergence, could in principle threaten the 
attainment of Maastricht criterion on inflation. This could, in turn, delay the countries’ 
entry into the euro area.   
Following the seminal contributions of Balassa and Samuelson just 40 years ago, the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is understood to explain the often observed tendency of prices 
for non-traded goods to increase faster than the prices of traded goods. The Balassa-
Samuelson effect offers as an explanation the differences in productivity growth between 
the traded and non-traded sectors. Starting point for the analysis is the observation that 
productivity growth in the traded goods sector is usually faster than in the non-traded 
goods sector. The reasons for this in the transition countries are straightforward.  With the 
freeing up of market controls and the opening of the economies, the sectors that were most 
quickly exposed to competitive pressures were the traded goods sectors.  That is, it is 
assumed that the law of one price holds for traded goods (but not for non-traded goods). As 
productivity in the traded goods sector increases, wages in that sector go up as well. It is 
assumed that labor is to some extent mobile across sectors, and therefore wages rise in the 
non-traded goods sector (such as the service sector and government) as well. Higher wages 
in the non-traded sector are possible only if the relative price of non-traded goods 
increases.  As wages increase throughout the economy more rapidly than average 
productivity, the overall price level increases as well.
13  The resulting inflation leads to an 
increase in the real exchange rate.   
In fact, interest in the Balassa-Samuelson effect stems from the observation of real 
exchange rate appreciation in transition countries.  The figure depicts evolution of the real 
                                                 
13  An appendix includes a formal presentation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect on inflation in the 
traded and non-traded goods sectors and on inflation differentials between countries (i.e. the real 
exchange rate changes). BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2004 
 
  36 
effective exchange rate in a number of transition countries between 1994 and 2002. We 
can see that there has been a general tendency for the real effective exchange rates to 
appreciate, although there have been reversals in the trend in some countries (e.g. in Russia 
after the August 1998 crisis).  
The enormous interest in EU accession and convergence has led to a large number of 
studies that test and measure the magnitude of the effect in the transition countries. Recent 
reviews are provided by Mihaljek (2002) and Égert (2003). Partly this strand of literature 
has been prompted by the EU accession countries’ desire to enter the euro area. As the 
entry criteria to the euro area include exchange rate stability
14 and inflation convergence,
15 
a strong tendency towards high inflation rates as the pace of structural adjustment in the 
traded and non-traded goods sectors diverge could endanger the simultaneous attainment 
of both criteria.  As the accession countries have grown faster than the current EU 
members, convergence in the income levels is taking place, although there are still 
considerable gap between per capita GDP in the current EU countries and the accession 
countries.
16 Therefore higher inflation, resulting from Balassa-Samuelson effect, is at least 
a possibility, if the nominal exchange rate is fixed. Also, as noted earlier, price levels in the 
accession countries are clearly lower than in the EU countries, and also in this respect there 
is room for catching up, i.e. higher inflation. 
Typically, empirical efforts to measure the Balassa-Samuelson effect regress the 
relative price of non-traded to traded goods on indicators of labor productivity in both 
sectors. Some recent contributions include Arratibel et al. (2002), Coricelli and Jazbec 
(2001), Mihaljek (2002), and Égert (2003). Arratibel et al. use monthly data between 1990 
and 2001 (when available) for 10 accession countries, and include a large number of 
control variables in their estimations. They find that Balassa-Samuelson effect is 
“relatively insignificant” in explaining inflation developments in the accession countries. 
Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) also include countries of the former Soviet Union in their 
estimation with data for 1990-1998.  They find that in the early years of transition 
                                                 
14 Exchange rate stability is defined as participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism for at least 
two years without devaluation of the central parity and without significant tensions in the foreign 
exchange market. Also, the exchange rate must be close to the central parity for the two-year 
period. 
15 Inflation can not exceed the average inflation of the three EU countries with the lowest inflation 
by more than 1.5 percentage points. 
16 In 2002, the average per capita GDP in the ten countries slated to join the EU in May 2004 was 
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structural reforms were more important in explaining relative price movements. Their 
estimate of the contribution of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is approximately one 
percentage point per annum. Mihaljek (2002) explains inflation differentials between the 
euro area and six transition countries with differential growth of productivity across 
sectors. The quarterly data starts from the mid-90s, and therefore avoids using observations 
from the early years of transition. With the exception of Slovenia, the contribution of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect to the annual inflation differential is less than one percentage 
point.  
One recurring problem in estimating relative prices is the definition of traded and non-
traded sectors. Many studies proxy traded goods prices with producer price index and non-
traded goods prices with consumer price index. Some others divide, for example, the GDP 
deflator into traded and non-traded parts. Sometimes everything except manufacturing is 
deemed non-traded, and sometimes agriculture is traded and sometimes not. Égert (2003) 
uses a very detailed dataset
17, which allows better distinction between traded and non-
traded sectors. Although the study concerns only Estonia, it can also shed light on the 
evolution of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the other transition countries. Although the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is estimated to average between 2% and 3% for the whole 
sample period (1993-2002), it is shown to decline quite clearly over the decade in question. 
At the end of the period the inflation contribution is less than one percentage point.
18 This 
is quite understandable, as Estonia has rapidly converged towards the EU level, both in per 
capita income and in productivity. 
In addition, empirical studies on Balassa-Samuelson effect have concentrated on the 
behavior of the real exchange rates. De Broeck and Sløk (2001) examine the effect of 
sectoral productivity growth on real exchange rate movements in a sample of 26 transition 
countries (and 17 OECD countries).  They find that differential productivity growth exerts 
a different influence on the real exchange rate in the accession countries compared to the 
other transition countries. In the EU accession countries the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
appears to have its predicted influence on real exchange rate, but in the other transition 
countries there appears to be very little connection between the two. In the accession 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, De Broeck and Sløk estimate the Balassa-
                                                 
17 CPI disaggregated into 260 items and GDP disaggregated into 15 sectors. 
18 As Estonia has a rigidly fixed exchange rate, the Balassa-Samuelson effect should manifest itself 
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Samuelson effect to raise annual inflation by one percentage point at the end of the sample 
period.   
The empirical research on Balassa-Samuelson effect confirms that it has had influence 
on inflation and real exchange rate developments in the transition countries. However, the 
estimated magnitude of Balassa-Samuelson effect is relatively small, generally around one 
percentage point per annum. Moreover, the size of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is 
supposed to decrease as income convergence takes place. This is also what is found in the 
empirical studies.  Policymakers in the accession countries can rest easy.  The thrust of the 
research on the Balassa-Samuelson effect suggests that inflation differentials are no more 
than 1-2 percent and will diminish over time.   
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7 Conclusions 
 
Disinflation in the transition economies has been, as we noted at the outset, remarkable. It 
is easy to look at the equally remarkable monetary reforms and attribute the disinflation 
success to them.  Indeed, inflation is a monetary phenomenon and the institutions for 
responsible monetary policy did not exist in these countries fifteen years ago.  Central 
banks as responsible and independent keepers of monetary discipline are a new 
phenomenon.  Moreover, the entire financial structure was geared to soft budget 
constraints that exacerbated inflation pressures.  So, one concluding observation is that 
disinflation is due to rapid institution building and important government sector structural 
reforms in many transition countries. Inflation continues to be a problem where 
institutional development lags. Proponents of specific monetary policy approaches will 
look to the transition countries for evidence that favors a particular policy stance.   
However, there has been substantial disinflation with every imaginable exchange rate 
regime
19 and approach to monetary policy.  We do not see evidence in support of a specific 
approach in the transition experience.  Instead, the transition experience argues in favor of 
good macroeconomic fundamentals.  In particular, fiscal constraint may be more important 
because it is a necessary precursor to an appropriate monetary policy. 
Finally, although the disinflation has been remarkable, there can be too much of a good 
thing.  The very low inflation rates attained in the in 2001 and 2002 throughout the region 
may not be sustainable.  First, there are large relative price adjustments still to be made.  
These adjustments are similar to an external shock that can influence inflation rates.   
Similarly, the recent disinflation might be largely due to transitory global shocks, which 
mask some of the remaining problems in the transition countries.  Second, any acceleration 
of inflation that results can easily erode confidence in policy makers and effect inflation 
expectations.  Similarly, any slowdown in the pace of EU expansion could lead to altered 
inflation expectations.  Third, the very low inflation rates divert attention from some of the 
macro fundamentals that could be problematic.  In particular, recent increases in 
government deficits are surprisingly large.  Moreover, remaining structural reforms need to 
effect some hard to reach sectors such as health care and pension systems.  So, contrary to 
                                                 
19 For a recent overview of exchange rate regimes in the accession countries, see Begg et al. (2003). Keller 
and Richardson (2003) discuss monetary policy frameworks and exchange rate regimes in the CIS. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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our original thoughts, perhaps the roller coaster ride called transition is not over.  Inflation 
rates might well diverge from developed country levels in many of the transition 
economies and it is not obvious how policy will respond.  Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
 
  41 
References 
 
Arratibel, Olga, Diego Rodriguez-Palenzuela and Christian Thimann.  “Inflation Dynamics 
  and Dual Inflation in Accession Countries: a ‘New Keynesian’ Perspective,” ECB 
 Working  Paper  No. 132, 2002. 
Begg, David.  “Monetary policy during transition: progress and pitfalls in central and 
  Eastern Europe, 1990-6,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 13, Summer 1997, 
 33-46.   
Begg, David. “Disinflation in Central Europe: The Experience to date,” in Cotarelli and 
 Szapary  (1998). 
Begg, David, Barry Eichengreen, László Halpern, Jürgen von Hagen and Charles Wyplosz. 
  "Sustainable Regimes of Capital Movements in Accession Countries," CEPR  Policy 
  Paper No.10, 2003.  
Bonin, John and Paul Wachtel.  “Financial Sector Development in Transition Economies: 
  Lessons from the First Decade,” Financial, Markets Institutions and Instruments 
 (13),  2003. 
Brada, Josef C. and Ali M. Kutan. “The end of moderate inflation in three transition 
  countries?”  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433, January 2002. 
Budina, N and S van Wijnbergen. “Fiscal Deficits, Monetary Reform and Inflation 
  Stabilization in Romania”  Journal of Comparative Economics. Volume 29 (2): 
  293-309, June 2001. 
Coorey, Sharmini, Mauro Mecagni, and Erik Offerdal, “Disinflation in Transition 
  Economies: The Role of relative price adjustment,” in Cottarelli and Szapary, 1998.   
-------------------, “Achieving low inflation in transition economies: The role of relative 
 price  adjustment,”  Finance and Development, IMF, March 1998. 
Coricelli, Fabrizio and Jazbec, Bostjan, “Real exchange rate dynamics in transition 
  economies.” CEPR Discussion Paper 2869, 2001. 
Cottarelli, Carlo and Peter Doyle, Disinflation in Transition, International Monetary Fund, 
 1999. 
Cottarelli, Carlo and Gyorgy Szapary, eds. Moderate Inflation: the experience of the 
 transition  economies, IMF and National Bank of Hungary, Washington, D.C. 1998. 
 BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2004 
 
  42 
Cukierman, Alex, Geoffrey P. Miller and Bilin Neyapti.  “Central bank reform, 
  liberalization and inflation in transition economies – an international perspective,” 
  Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 2002, pp. 237-64. 
Dabrowkski, Marek and others. Disinflation, monetary policy and fiscal constraints: 
  Experience of the Economies in Transition, CASE Report #16, Warsaw, Poland, 
 March  1999. 
Dabrowski, Marek, ed. Disinflation in Transition Economies, Central European Press, 
 Budapest,  2003. 
De Broeck, Mark and Torsten Sløk,  “Interpreting real exchange rate movements in 
  transition countries.” Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition 
  Discussion Paper, July 2001. 
De Menil, Georges. “History, policy and performance in two transition economies: Poland 
  and Romania” in D. Rodrik, ed., In Search of Prosperity, Princeton U. Press, 2003.  
Domac, Ilker and Carlos Elbirt. “The Main Determinants of Inflation in Albania,: World 
  Bank Policy Research Working Paper #1930, 1998. 
Égert, Balazs, “Nominal and real convergence in Estonia: The Balassa-Samuelson 
  (dis)connection.” Bank of Estonia Working Paper, April 2003. 
Filer, Randall K. and Jan Hanousek, “Inflationary Bias in middle to late Transition Czech 
  Republic.” August 2003. 
Fischer, Stanley; Sahay, Ratna; Vegh, Carlos A (1997), From Transition to Market: 
  Evidence and Growth Prospects, IMF Working Paper WP/98/52. 
Groshen, Erica L. and Mark E. Schweitzer, “Inflation Goals: Guidance from the Labor 
 Market?”,  Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of 
  New York, (3, #15), December 1997.  
 Havrylyshyn, Oleh.  “…” in M. Blejer and M. Skreb, eds.Macroeconomic stabilization in 
 transition  economies, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
IMF, Romania: 2002 Staff Report. Country Report No. 03/11. January 2003 
Jones, Jiri and Frederic Mishkin.  “Inflation Targeting in Transition Countries: Experience 
  and Prospects,” NBER Working Paper 9667, April 2003. 
Keller, Peter M. and Thomas Richardson. "Nominal Anchors in the CIS." IMF Working 
  Paper, September 2003. 
Koen, Vincent and Paul De Masi. “Prices in Transition: Ten Stylized Facts,” IMF Working 
  Paper, November 1997. Paul Wachtel Iikka Korhonen  Observations on disinflation  
in transition economies  
 
  43 
Mihaljek, Dubravko, “The Balassa-Samuelson effect in Central Europe: A disaggregated 
  analysis.” Paper presented at the 8
th Dubrovnik Economic Conference, National 
  Bank of Croatia, June 2002.  
Odling-Smee, John and Gonzalo Pastor, "The IMF and the Ruble Area, 1991-93," IMF 
  Working Paper, August 2001. 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Poland, 2002. 
OECD Economic Surveys. Romania: Economic Assessment. Volume 2002/17. 
Randveer, M., “The Income Convergence between EU and Accession Countries.” Eesti 
Pank Working Papers No. 6,  2000.  
Rother, Philipp C. “Inflation in Albania,” IMF Working Paper, December 2000. 
Roubini, Nouriel and Paul Wachtel. “Current Account Sustainability in Transition 
 Economies,”  in  Balance of payments, exchange rates and competitiveness in   
 transition  economies,  M. Blejer and M. Skreb, eds. Kluwer Publishers, 1999. 
Wozniak, Przemyslaw. “Relative prices and inflation in Poland 1989-97: The special role 
  of administered prices,” World Bank working paper, February, 1998. 
 
  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2004 
 
  44 
APPENDIX: The Balassa-Samuelson effect 
 
More formally, we can briefly sketch a version of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. A similar 
exposition can be found e.g. in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999). It is assumed that a small open 
economy produces two composite goods, tradables and non-tradables. If we let the 
subscript T to denote the traded sector and NT the non-traded sector, output is given by 




NT NT NT NT
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       (4.1) 
 
Ki denotes capital used in the sector i, and Li labor in sector i. The supply of labor fixed at 
L=LT+LNT. Labor is immobile internationally, but can move between the two domestic 
sectors. This insures that workers will earn the same wage in both sectors. Capital is 
mobile internationally, and because of this domestic capital’s rate of return is equal to the 
world interest rate r. We can define capital-labor ratios in the two sectors as kT≡KT/LT and 
kNT≡KNT/LNT and express output per a worker employed as yT=ATf(kT)  ≡ATF(kT,1) and 
yNT=ANTg(kNT) ≡ANTG(kNT,1). The relative price of non-tradable goods in terms of tradables 
is p. With this notation, we can write four first-order conditions (two relating to traded 
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As r is given by the international capital markets, the four first-order conditions allow us to 
determine the four unknown, w, p, kT and kN. 
To assess the dynamic implications of the aforementioned analysis, one can take 
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Here variables marked with “^” denote logarithmic derivatives (or very small percentage 
changes), and µLT and µLNT are the labor’s share of income generated in the tradables and 
non-tradables sectors, respectively. As wages are equal across sectors, the ratio of µLNT to 











         ( 4 . 4 )  
 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect assumes that purchasing power parity holds for the traded 
goods, i.e. their price is the same across countries (when expressed in the same currency). 
In the following, we use the price of tradables as numeraire and set it to be 1. If one writes 
the price level both in the home country (P) and rest of the world (or in the relevant trading 
partner, P
*) as a geometric average of the tradable and non-tradable goods, with the weight 















          ( 4 . 5 )  
 
Here p is the price of non-tradables in the home country and p
* is the price of non-tradables 
in the foreign country. By log-differentiating 4.5 and using the expression for changes in 
the price of non-tradables (4.3), we can assess the effect of relative productivity changes on 
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If the ratio of µLNT to µLT is larger than one, real exchange rate of a country will appreciate, 
if productivity in its tradable sector, relative to the foreign country, rises faster than 
productivity in its non-tradables, again relative to the foreign country. It is generally 
assumed that this is the case in poorer countries, which are in the process of catching up 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 




Table 3. Monetization ratios 
 1995  2001 
Albania 46.8  64.4 
Armenia (M3)  7.7  13.4 
Azerbaijan 12.3  12.9 
Belarus 15.0  15.2 
Bosnia 14.8  44.6 
Bulgaria 65.4  40.9 
Croatia  (M4)  25.0  65.1 
Czech Rep  75.3  73.4 
Estonia 26.5  41.7 
FYR Macedonia  11.0  29.8 
Georgia  (M3)  5.0  11.1 
Hungary 41.9  46.9 
Kazakhstan 11.4  17.7 
Kyrgyz Rep.  (M3)  17.2  11.1 
Latvia 22.5  32.0 
Lithuania 22.7  26.7 
Moldova  (M3)  16.5  23.3 
Poland 36.1  43.8 
Romania 25.3  23.2 
Russia 15.5  17.7 
Serbia ---  14.0 
Slovak Rep.  65.4  70.5 
Slovenia 27.8  41.2 
Tajikstan 19.1  9.5 
Turkmenistan  (M3)  18.9  17.6 
Ukraine  (M3)  12.7  22.3 
Uzbekistan  (M3)  18.2  12.4 
 
Source:  EBRD data 
Note: Ratios of M2 to GDP in % unless otherwise noted in parentheses. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 




 Table 4a.   Price levels relative to the OECD or the US 
 
  Relative to OECD 29  Relative to OECD 30  Relative to the US 
 1990  1993  1996  1998  1999 2000 2001 2003 
Czech 
Republic 
23 30 39 41 39  36  39  55 
Hungary  38 43 44 45 42  39  43  54 
Poland  29 38 46 49 45  45  51  53 
Slovak 
Republic 
    33  32  33  37 
  
 Source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD, February 1999 and October 2003. 
 
 
 Table 4b   Price levels relative to OECD, 1999 by type of goods 
 
 Bu  Cr  Cz  Es  Hu  La  Li Po  Ro  Ru  Sk  Sl Uk 
Consumer  
Non durables 
42 77  58 60  60 63  59  61  43 40 51  87  34 
Consumer 
Semi durables 
43 90  65 72  62 93  74  68  32 53 54  85  45 
Consumer durables  48  90  70 64  73 79  69  81  63 69 63  79  71 
Producers goods  40  66  60 77  66 74  71  64  43 31 59  80  37 
Consumer services  19  39  26 31  30 29  24  34  24 13 20  51  11 
Government services  12 39  23 23  24 19  19  27  13 8  17  47  5 
GDP 24  54  39 43  42 42  38  45  29 22 33  64  17 
 
 Source: Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures, OECD 2002, Table 11. 
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